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and Seth David Guikema1
Risk analysis standards are often employed to protect critical infrastructures, which are vital
to a nation’s security, economy, and safety of its citizens. We present an analysis framework
for evaluating such standards and apply it to the J100-10 risk analysis standard for water and
wastewater systems. In doing so, we identify gaps between practices recommended in the
standard and the state of the art. While individual processes found within infrastructure risk
analysis standards have been evaluated in the past, we present a foundational review and
focus specifically on water systems. By highlighting both the conceptual shortcomings and
practical limitations, we aim to prioritize the shortcomings needed to be addressed. Key find-
ings from this study include (1) risk definitions fail to address notions of uncertainty, (2) the
sole use of “worst reasonable case” assumptions can lead to mischaracterizations of risk, (3)
analysis of risk and resilience at the threat-asset resolution ignores dependencies within the
system, and (4) stakeholder values need to be assessed when balancing the tradeoffs between
risk reduction and resilience enhancement.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
federal government recognized the need to define
and prioritize the requirements for protecting the
nation’s infrastructure (American Water Works
Association [AWWA], 2010). As a result, the U.S.
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (United States of
America Congress, 2002) prescribed a cross-sector
risk assessment plan to identify vulnerabilities for all
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) and
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define a framework to prioritize defense resource
allocation. As defined in the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) of 2009 (Department of
Homeland Security [DHS], 2009), CIKRs include
energy, water (drinking and waste), transportation,
communications, and government facilities.
The potential importance of a uniform risk
analysis procedure was recognized when the White
House recruited the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) to develop a procedure applica-
ble across different types of infrastructure (AWWA,
2010). The goal was that common terminology, met-
rics, and methodology would facilitate comparisons
within and across CIKR sectors, and support deci-
sion making for risk reduction investments. In 2006,
ASME released the specifications for Risk Analy-
sis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
(RAMCAPTM), which serves as the basis for J100-10
(AWWA, 2010). RAMCAPTM defines a seven-step
process (discussed in Section 1.2) to assess risk and
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resilience for a given asset and to prioritize counter-
measures.
RAMCAPTM outlines three major objectives
(ASME-ITI LLC, 2005): (1) to define a common
framework for owners and operators of critical in-
frastructure to assess consequences and vulnerabil-
ities relating to terrorist attacks on their assets and
systems, (2) to provide guidance on methods that
can be used to assess and evaluate risk through this
framework, and (3) to provide an efficient and con-
sistent mechanism to report risk information to the
US DHS.
The AWWA adopted the RAMCAPTM seven-
step framework to create a water and wastewater
sector specific risk analysis standard, and in 2010
published the J100-10 standard for Risk and Re-
silience Management of Water and Wastewater
Systems (AWWA, 2010). While RAMCAPTM and
J100-10 were initially developed with the intent
of analyzing risks associated with terrorist attacks
(ASME-ITI LLC, 2005), subsequent updates ex-
panded the analysis breadth to include a variety of
threats (e.g., natural hazards, dependency, and prox-
imity threats). Beyond allowing utility operators to
systematically assess risk, J100-10 provides methods
to evaluate options for improving weaknesses in wa-
ter and wastewater systems (AWWA, 2010). The aim
is to prioritize the actions that better mitigate risks
and can lead to more resilient critical infrastructure.
We use the term risk analysis in this article as
it is defined in the Society of Risk Analysis (SRA,
2015) glossary. Risk analysis is “a systematic process
to comprehend the nature of risk and to express risk
with the available knowledge.” A fundamental prin-
ciples document from SRA highlights some key cri-
teria for a high-quality risk analysis (Society of Risk
Analysis, 2018): it needs to be reliable, valid, and
the decision maker needs to have confidence in the
results. Reliable means that there is reproducibility
in the process (encompassing analyst, methods, pro-
cedures, etc.), and valid meaning there is success at
characterizing the relevant risks. A key is that the de-
gree of knowledge (or lack thereof) of the analyst is
properly communicated to the decision maker. The
ultimate goal is to inform and support decision mak-
ing for risk management.
In this article, we provide an analysis framework
for assessing risk analysis standards and present a
holistic review of J100-10 to highlight its conceptual
shortcomings and practical limitations. Our goal in
this article is to begin a conversation about how to
strengthen the J100-10 moving forward.
1.2. J100-10 Definitions
Two key components of a risk management stan-
dard are the definitions and the underlying con-
ceptualizations of risk. Before proceeding further
with our assessment, we include key definitions from
J100-10 (AWWA, 2010), which were adopted from
RAMCAPTM. The following definitions are taken
verbatim from the standard, and a discussion on their
sufficiency is presented in later sections. For ease of
reading, we have eliminated block quotations.
Risk is “the potential for loss or harm due to the
likelihood of an unwanted event and its adverse con-
sequences” (J100-10 manual [AWWA, 2010], p. 18).
J100-10 uses the RAMCAPTM approach to quantify
risk using Equation (1) below (AWWA, 2010):
Risk = Threat Likelihood × Consequence
× Vulnerability. (1)
Threat likelihood is “the probability that an un-
desired event will occur” (J100-10 manual [AWWA,
2010], p. 49). With natural hazards, J100-10 states
that this should be “the historical frequency of
similar events, unless there is a belief that the future
will differ from the past. With malevolent threats,
the likelihood is a function of available intelligence,
the objectives and capabilities of the adversary,
and the attractiveness as a target” (J100-10 manual
[AWWA, 2010], p. 49).
Consequence is defined as “the immediate, short-
and long-term effects of a malevolent attack or natu-
ral incident” (J100-10 manual [AWWA, 2010], p. 43),
which J100-10 specifies should be estimated exclu-
sively on a “worst reasonable case basis” (J100-10
manual [AWWA, 2010], p. 8). These effects include
fatalities, injuries, and losses suffered by the owner of
the asset and by the community served by that asset.
Vulnerability is “an inherent state of the system
(e.g., physical, technical, organizational, cultural)
that can be exploited by an adversary or impacted by
a natural hazard to cause harm or damage” (J100-10
manual [AWWA, 2010], p. 49). J100-10 specifies that
vulnerability should be expressed as the likelihood
of an event resulting in the estimated consequences,
given that the event occurs.
Resilience is “the ability of an asset or system to
withstand an attack or natural hazard without inter-
ruption of performing the asset or system’s function
or, if the function is interrupted, to restore the func-
tion rapidly” (J100-10 manual [AWWA, 2010], p. 19).
Resilience can be considered at the threat-asset level
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or at the system level. Asset-level resilience is defined
on a scale such that lower values indicate greater re-
silience. It can be calculated using the following three
metrics:
(1) Operational resilience metric (ORM) mea-
sures the service denial due to a threat-asset
pair, weighted by vulnerability and threat like-
lihood. It is calculated as (AWWA, 2010):
ORM = Duration × Severity
× Vulnerability
× Threat Likelihood, (2)
where duration is the time, in days, of service
denial and severity is the amount of service de-
nied (in gallons of water per day).
(2) Owner’s economic resilience metric (OERM)
converts ORM into a dollar value and charac-
terizes the financial loss to the utility owner,
and is calculated as (AWWA, 2010):
OERM = ORM × Preincident Unit Price.
(3)
(3) Community economic resilience metric is the
lost economic activity, in dollars, to the com-
munity served by the utility. Estimating these
impacts requires a regional simulator and/or
economic model to fully capture the direct and
indirect effects.
1.3. J100-10 Risk Analysis Process
J100-10 outlines a seven-step risk analysis pro-
cess, as shown in Fig. 1.
Below we provide a brief description of each of
the seven steps of the assessment methodology.
(1) Asset characterization: Identify the critical as-
sets, which, if compromised, would inhibit the
organization from carrying out its mission or
operational goals. Asset ranking can be used
to prioritize components for analysis if the
number is too large to include them all.
(2) Threat characterization: Identify and describe
reference threats scenarios to estimate vulner-
ability and consequence. Reference categories
include malevolent threats, natural hazards,
and proximity and dependency threats. Ad-
ditional threats can be added as long as they
are used in the analysis of all assets under
consideration.
(3) Consequence analysis: Identify and estimate
the “worst reasonable consequence” gen-
erated by each threat-asset combination.
Consequence metric categories include fatal-
ity count, serious injury count, financial loss
to the owners, and economic losses to the
community.
(4) Vulnerability analysis: Estimate the condi-
tional likelihood that, given an adverse
event occurs on the asset, the estimated
Fig. 1. The adopted RAMCAPTM process in the J100-10. Taken from the J100-10 risk management standard (AWWA, 2010).
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consequences will occur. Some methods for es-
timating this value suggested by J100-10 in-
clude direct expert elicitation, path analysis,
vulnerability logic diagrams, event trees, or a
hybrid of these methods.
(5) Threat assessment: Estimate the probability
that each of the identified threats will occur in
a given time frame (typically one year). J100-
10 provides guidance on how to estimate these
values for different types of threats, for exam-
ple, an event tree-based approach for malev-
olent threats, or using federal agency-specific
resources for various natural hazards (e.g.,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) flood insurance rate maps, or the Na-
tional Hurricane Center risk analysis program,
HURISK).
(6) Risk and resilience assessment: Use Equa-
tion (1) to calculate the risk metric and Equa-
tions (2) and (3) to calculate the resilience met-
rics for each threat-asset pair. Resilience can
also be considered at the system level. J100-10
outlines a utility resilience index (URI), which
assesses the operational and financial capabili-
ties of the utility to cope with various incidents
that have the potential to disrupt service.
(7) Risk and resilience management: Implement
actions to achieve a level of acceptable risk
and resilience at an acceptable cost. Benefit-
cost analysis is useful for suggesting poten-
tial actions, for example, new security counter-
measures or consequence mitigation features.
Benefits are calculated as the expected risk re-
duction or resilience increases and costs are
defined in dollar units.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Standardized Risk Analysis Methods in the
Water Sector
By one estimate, there are more than 250 critical
infrastructure risk analysis methods (Lewis, Darken,
& Dudenhoeffer, 2012). Many of these methods have
been used in other risk analysis standards to study
water infrastructure prior to the development of
RAMCAPTM or J100-10. Three of these prior stan-
dards in particular have been widely documented and
used (AWWA, 2010). They are (1) the Risk Assess-
ment Methodology—Water (RAM − WTM) (Jaeger,
Hightower, & Torres, 2010) developed by Sandia Na-
tional Laboratories, (2) the Scientech and PA Con-
sulting Group Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool
(VSATTM) (PA Government Services & Scientech
Inc., 2002), and (3) the National Rural Water Associ-
ation Security and Environmental Management Sys-
tem (SEMSTM) (NRWA, 2002). RAM − WTM was
specifically developed to evaluate the risk of adver-
sarial threats. It is a water sector-specific version of
the RAMCAPTM standard (see Section 1.3 for gen-
eral seven-step approach) that focuses on risk quan-
tification, while J100-10 analyzes both risk and re-
silience. VSATTM was originally intended for use by
wastewater utilities, but was later adapted to include
drinking water utilities. It uses a risk matrix, esti-
mated as a combination of qualitative criticality and
vulnerability ratings, to determine which assets need
security improvements (Amass, 2006). SEMSTM was
developed for small systems in rural areas. It uses
a simple “yes” or “no” questionnaire to help own-
ers of utilities identify vulnerabilities and improve-
ment actions. While it does not describe any explicit
quantification of risk, SEMSTM provides information
about the operating conditions and asset status of the
utility.
Following the release of RAMCAPTM, VSATTM
and RAM − WTM have been modified to be consis-
tent with the RAMCAPTM seven-step framework.
SEMSTM has been adapted to include questions that
cover basic information required by RAMCAPTM
(AWWA, 2010), such as certain security measures.
Despite the wide variety of available assessment
frameworks, we chose to evaluate J100-10 because it
was the first standard to include both a wide range of
risk sources and all types of water infrastructure in its
analysis.
2.2. J100-10 and RAMCAPTM Critiques
In this section, we review some of the pre-
vious critiques and contextualize them within our
broader review of J100-10. Presented critiques of
J100-10 have broader implications for the par-
ent RAMCAPTM standard. Because RAMCAPTM
serves as the foundation of J100-10, we include cri-
tiques of this standard as well.
While the J100-10 and RAMCAPTM standards
do not mandate that utilities report risk assess-
ment results or implement countermeasures, some
utilities have documented the use of the approach
to guide decision making to improve facility secu-
rity. A cross-infrastructure sector implementation is
found in Krimgold (2012), where the RAMCAPTM
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methodology is implemented to analyze power,
water, transport, and communications systems in
an unnamed metropolitan region. This is done to
better identify specific threats and their respec-
tive consequences across sectors. The study con-
cludes that the RAMCAPTM asset-level assessment
provides useful guidance on defining risk through
operational units, which assists in the prioritiza-
tion of short- and long-term risk management
goals.
Herrera, Flannery, and Krimmer (2017) exam-
ine an implementation of RAMCAPTM to Col-
orado’s transportation sector, which helped identify
system vulnerabilities and assisted in supporting fed-
eral emergency response funding requests. The De-
partment of Transportation favored the benefit–cost
analysis within the risk and resilience management
step used to evaluate multiple mitigation options
since it provided a data-driven approach to support
decision making.
An implementation specific to the water sector
is found in Kerr, Singh, and Motala (2015), which
provides a case study from a utility in Peel, CA. In
this study, the utility uses the J100-10 assessment
method to develop a long-term strategy to manage
and reduce risk through capital investment and op-
erational planning. The authors find that using the
J100-10 analysis framework gives the utility a more
complete and unbiased understanding of the assets
that are at highest risk, which allows for a clearer
process for capital investment decision making. In
addition, the risk and resilience management guide-
lines provide a framework for the continual review
and revision of the analysis as mitigation plans are
implemented.
A number of academic studies have critiqued
the risk assessment methodology outlined in the
RAMCAPTM standard. High-level critiques include
Cox (2008a), which emphasizes the shortcomings
of the threat-vulnerability-consequence triplet def-
inition of risk as well as the ordinal scales used
in the RAMCAPTM risk calculation. Some of the
main limitations discussed by Cox (2008a) are that
RAMCAPTM fails to address possible correlations
between the threat, vulnerability, and consequence
components. Additionally, it does not account for
nonadditivity of risk when aggregating from the
analysis level of threat-asset pairs to system-level
risk estimates, the use of ordinal scoring values to
calculate risk can lead to suboptimal allocation of
resources for implementing countermeasures, and
notions of uncertainty related to the estimates of
threats and consequences are not addressed in the
analysis.
Burkhart (2015) identifies consistency and scope
problems in the J100-10 standard; for example, the
utility is given the choice to analyze the resilience at
either the asset or system level, but no guidance is
provided on how to choose between the two resolu-
tions. Furthermore, no concrete process is outlined
for defining a single level of acceptable risk, espe-
cially if multiple decision makers are involved. As a
more general critique of assessments using risk-based
scoring methods for resource allocation, Cox (2009)
specifies that such an approach often fails to account
for interdependencies and risk externalities (risk for
parts of a system changes as countermeasures are
added) among the considered threats.
Critiques of specific steps within the J100-10 pro-
cess have been discussed in the academic literature.
Cox (2008b) highlights the limitations of using risk
matrices to drive prioritization decisions. Such use of
risk matrix methods from RAMCAPTM can be found
in the asset characterization step, which is used to
screen assets for analysis to reduce the scope of the
risk assessment. The study argues that risk matrices
often have poor risk resolution and errors in risk es-
timation, which can lead to suboptimal prioritization
decisions.
Consequence estimation, as defined in the J100-
10 and RAMCAPTM standards, are based solely on
a “worst reasonable case” (AWWA, 2010) premise,
the common thinking being that this results in a con-
servative (inflated) estimate of risk intended to add
a factor of safety. A case study in off-sea oil drilling
presented by Hauge et al. (2014)) highlights the lim-
itations of this approach. The authors explain that
uncertainties related to characterizing extreme out-
comes and their likelihoods can limit the usefulness
of an assessment.
The threat analysis step in the RAMCAPTM
methodology defines 41 reference threats, which in-
clude terrorist threats, natural hazards, and depen-
dency hazards. The J100-10 standard uses the same
41 reference threats and provides details for analyz-
ing risk from these threats. However, White, George,
Boult, and Chow (2016) recognize the failure of this
process to account for key emerging threats (climate
change, aging infrastructure, and cyber attacks) and
propose 13 additional reference threats to address
these emerging issues. As a follow-up study, White,
Burkhart, Boult, and Chow, (2016) use a simulated
RAMCAPTM model to analyze the performance un-
der the proposed set of 54 threats.
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The risk and resilience analysis step defines risk
as the product of the consequence, vulnerability, and
threat likelihood, which make up the triplet defi-
nition of risk. The shortcomings of this approach
are well-established in the risk science literature,
where the main concern is that the potential for ex-
treme outcomes is not properly reflected. Alternative
and more general perspectives have been developed
where risk captures the triplet events, consequences,
and uncertainties, see Society of Risk Analysis
(SRA), 2015 and Aven (2012, 2017b). These perspec-
tives are built on Kaplan and Garrick (1981), who re-
fer to risk qualitatively as “uncertainty plus damage.”
As shown above, there have been multiple
case studies reported on the implementation of
the J100-10 standard in the water and wastewater
sector and of RAMCAPTM in other infrastructure
systems. There are also a number of studies by risk
analysts highlighting the limitations of RAMCAPTM
and the methodologies it recommends for analyzing
risk and resilience. These critiques have focused on
specific issues within certain steps of the analysis.
In the subsequent sections, we will present a more
comprehensive critique of the J100-10 assessment
process as a whole.
3. ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Here, we define our framework for evaluating
the J100-10 standard. The approach can be imple-
mented for a variety of risk analysis standards out-
side the water infrastructure domain.
Based on the criteria for a risk analysis outlined
in Section 1.1, we identify two questions of emphasis:
(1) are risk and other key concepts (e.g., probability
and resilience) being characterized adequately? and
(2) are the recommended procedures in line with the
state-of-the-art in risk science? The point here is to
determine whether the assessment process will lead
to proper characterizations of risk that adequately
supports decision making. If fundamental concepts
are not appropriately conceptualized, the subsequent
analysis will not reveal key issues. Similarly, if the
state-of-the-art methods are not adopted, poor risk
characterizations could impact communication and
ultimately misguide the decision maker.
As a result, in this research we conceptually com-
pare J100-10 against the state-of-the art in risk sci-
ence. We choose this approach because it focuses on
the foundational issues of the risk analysis field and
measures the process against these established prin-
ciples. An alternative approach is to implement both
J100-10 and a second risk analysis method and com-
pare their outputs. This can be tricky because various
assessments are beset by tradeoffs of completeness,
consistency, and timeliness (White, Burkhart, et al.,
2016). The development of a process to directly com-
pare multiple frameworks is beyond the scope of our
analysis and is left for future research.
Our analytical framework can be divided into
two categories: conceptual and practical limitations.
The former addresses the theoretical shortcomings.
The latter addresses specific steps, which could lead
to poor risk characterizations. We primarily focus on
the risk analysis portion of J100-10, but also discuss
its guidelines for assessing resilience. We present our
findings of the conceptual and practical limitations in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
4. CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS
In the following section, we identify conceptual
gaps related to definitions of key terms, how they are
calculated and interpreted in the standard, and how
they relate to the state-of-the art in the field of risk
analysis.
4.1. Definitions of Risk
The operating risk definition in the J100-10 stan-
dard falls short because concept of uncertainty is not
included. J100-10 uses the expected consequences
definition of risk, which is calculated as the product
of the probability of a threat event, the conditional
probability that the event will lead to the worst-case
consequences, and the consequences themselves (see
Equation 1). As discussed in Section 2.2, this under-
standing of risk has severe limitations and its use can
seriously mislead decision makers.
An analysis of the literature shows that there are
multiple definitions of risk: some are broader, while
others lead more naturally to quantifiable equations.
By distinguishing between the concept of risk and
how it is measured, a consensus can be reached on
characteristics of risk, as shown by the Society for
Risk Analysis Glossary (2015). Aven (2012) discusses
the issue and argues that a notion of uncertainty is re-
quired to capture the concept of risk. Analysts clas-
sify uncertainty in two ways (Paté-Cornell, 1996): (1)
aleatory uncertainty, which reflects variation in pop-
ulations and (2) epistemic uncertainty, which reflects
lack of knowledge. The latter type of uncertainty is
key to understanding and characterizing risk, while
the former is used to build probabilistic models, when
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justified, and support the epistemic uncertainty char-
acterizations. Understanding where sources of uncer-
tainty lie can help utilities better interpret assessment
results and guide management decisions to reduce
uncertainty for future analyses. J100-10 does not at-
tempt to address uncertainty in the analysis pro-
cess, evidenced by the fact the word “uncertainty”
does not appear anywhere in the standard. While
there is debate regarding how uncertainties should be
characterized and propagated in assessments, for ex-
ample, some arguing probabilities fully capture un-
certainty (Winkler, 1996) and others advocating for
other methods (Flage, Aven, Zio, & Baraldi, 2014;
Hoffman & Hammonds, 1994; Paté-Cornell, 1996), it
is evident that the current J100-10 framework falls
short because uncertainty is not addressed at all.
Including the concept of uncertainty in the
definition of risk can improve the assessment frame-
work of J100-10. The most common method is
probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) (Apostolakis,
2004), which uses probabilities as the sole measure
of uncertainty. Flage et al. (2014) and Shortridge,
Aven, and Guikema (2017) outline a variety of
other analysis methods, from simpler models that
use qualitative assessments of uncertainty, to more
sophisticated technical models (e.g., use of possibility
bounds and evidence theory).
Another approach is to assess the underlying
strength of knowledge when using probabilistic judg-
ments, for example, in relation to expert opinions.
Experts include utility operators and shareholders,
and they can be used to assess threat likelihoods
and consequence measures when data is unavailable
(AWWA, 2010). Typically, a stronger background
knowledge is correlated with lower degrees of uncer-
tainty. In performing this assessment, the uncertainty
description becomes a function of their strength of
background knowledge (Askeland, Flage, & Aven,
2017). Askeland et al. (2017) present a framework
to evaluate strength of knowledge, categorizing it as
“weak,” “moderate,” or “strong” based on five cri-
teria: (1) expert’s understanding of the phenomena,
(2) reliability and availability of data, (3) agreement
among experts, (4) identification, documentation,
and soundness of assumptions, and (5) evaluation of
knowledge gaps and changes in knowledge over time.
Aven, Baraldi, Roger, and Zio (2013) present an al-
ternative method for assessing strength of knowledge
through assumption deviation risk scores. Assump-
tion deviation risk is defined as “risk related to a de-
viation between what has been assumed and what
actually occurs” (Apostolakis, 2004). To assess the
risk, consideration is given to deviation probabili-
ties, consequences of deviation, and related strength
of knowledge judgments. Subsequent updates to the
J100-10 standard can employ one or more of these
methods or develop methods more suitable for ap-
plication in the water industry.
4.2. Concepts of Probability
Probabilities are an integral part of the risk as-
sessment process in J100-10. The standard defines
probability on page 43 as follows:
“A measure of the likelihood, degree of belief, fre-
quency, or chance that a particular event will occur in
a period of time (usually one year) or number of iter-
ations or trials. This is usually expressed quantitatively
as a value between 0 and 1, a range of values between 0
and 1, a distribution (density function), or the mean of
such a distribution. Probability can also be expressed in
qualitative terms, for example, low, medium, or high, if
there is a common understanding of the meaning of the
qualitative terms.” (AWWA, 2010)
The definition presented is unclear in two ways.
First, there are multiple ways outlined to represent
probabilities. For clear interpretation of results to
drive decision making, it is vital to have a consis-
tent probability representation. Second, how these
probabilities should be interpreted is left ambiguous.
Aven and Reniers (2013) highlight the practical im-
portance for decision makers to understand what the
risk analysis is communicating. For this reason, a con-
cise definition of probability and its interpretation is
required. Many previous studies have discussed this
issue at length (see, for example, Aven & Reniers,
2013; White, Burkhart, et al. 2016, White, George,
et al. 2016). The body of work categorizes probabil-
ity into two major schools of thought: frequentist and
Bayesian.
The “frequentist” interpretation defines the
probability of an event as the fraction of “successes”
over a hypothetical infinite series of independent
and identical trials. An asymptotic relationship is as-
sumed where, as the number of trials increases, the
fraction of successes will converge to the “true” value
(according to the law of large numbers), which is in-
terpreted as the probability of the event. The true
probability is, in most cases, unknown and needs to
be estimated. On the other hand, the “Bayesian”
view defines probability as a measure of the asses-
sor’s degree of belief about the event. This numeri-
cal encoding of one’s belief is always conditional on
the assessor’s knowledge base. Often, an example of
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drawing balls from an urn is used to provide an in-
terpretation of the probabilities (Aven & Reniers,
2013).
The J100-10 standard needs to be clear on which
form of probability is used in each of the risk analy-
sis steps because the two approaches can lead to dif-
ferent interpretations of the analysis, and ultimately
lead to different actions in practice (Aven & Reniers,
2013). When a frequentist view is used, it is impor-
tant that the historical records are representative of
future scenarios. The uncertainties of the frequen-
tist estimates also need to be addressed. Similarly,
when a Bayesian probability is adopted, evaluating
the analyst’s strength of knowledge on the matter is
critical to understanding the usefulness of the assess-
ment. Furthermore, communicating this knowledge
level is essential for the accurate interpretation of a
Bayesian probability. This results in the necessity to
see beyond just the numerical value. An assessment
process is required to evaluate the strength of knowl-
edge as well, where a high strength of subject knowl-
edge gives the analysis more authority and vice versa
(Aven, 2013, 2017b).
The J100-10 standard gives some flexibility for
the analysts to decide which type of probability they
wish to use (see p. 29 of the J100-10 standard for elic-
iting probabilities for proximity and dependency haz-
ards). Making the different types of probability clear
and how they are to be interpreted can help the an-
alyst choose the more suitable method depending on
data availability and their strength of knowledge on
the system.
While the J100-10 standard deals with threats
from many different sources, a particular emphasis is
misplaced on terrorism risk, as evidenced by 31 of the
41 reference hazards being malevolent threats. J100-
10 acknowledges that a true terrorism threat likeli-
hood estimation is beyond the scope of most water
sector risk analysis (AWWA, 2010), but suggests that
estimating a proxy for this value can provide useful
information for decision making. Equation (1) indi-
cates that determining the annual likelihood of attack
and the conditional likelihood of certain outcomes
given an attack are key components of quantifying
terrorism risk.
However, there is debate in the risk analysis
literature regarding whether assigning static prob-
abilities is even feasible. One group (see Aven &
Guikema, 2015; Aven & Renn, 2009; Brown & Cox,
2011; Cox, 2009) argues that the intelligent nature of
the adversary makes assigning meaningful and useful
probabilities problematic if not impossible. Bayesian
probabilities of attack can be elicited through ex-
perts, but are misleading because the defender and
attacker act on different knowledge bases. Others ar-
gue that employing a game theoretic approach (Pate-
Cornell & Guikema, 2002; Sandler, 2003; Sandler
& Enders, 2004), which requires some simplifying
assumptions on the adversary, provides a foundation
from which probabilities can be assigned. Unfor-
tunately, these basic assumptions are rarely met in
practice and renders the method deeply flawed. For
example, there is no common knowledge between all
actors, nor do the attackers always behave rationally.
J100-10 takes a more simplistic approach for es-
timating static probabilities, adopting a method de-
veloped by Risk Management Solutions, LLC. The
process is outlined in a RAND Corporation report
(Dixon, Lempert, LaTournette, & Reville, 2007) and
detailed in Appendix F of J100-10 (AWWA, 2010).
The method characterizes attack probability as the
product of six values: (1) the likelihood an attack will
occur, (2) the likelihood the attack will occur in a
given metro area, (3) the likelihood water infrastruc-
ture will be targeted for attack, (4) the likelihood a
subclass of facilities will be selected out of all wa-
ter infrastructure (e.g., reservoirs, treatment plants,
etc.), (5) the likelihood of a certain facility being tar-
geted, and finally (6) the likelihood of the specific
threat-asset pair being chosen.
Determining the likelihoods at each step uses a
mixture of both frequentist and Bayesian perspec-
tives. The approach J100-10 adopts a Bayesian driven
analysis when eliciting probabilities of attack for a
metro region (step 2) and for a specific threat-asset
pair (step 6). It is important that an appropriate elici-
tation from subject experts include consideration of
adversary intent, capabilities, and options. In con-
trast, a frequentist approach is used when estimating
the likelihood of which facility type (e.g., reservoir or
pump station) and which specific site will be selected
for attack. Because of the deep uncertainty surround-
ing intelligent adversaries, we argue that the J100-10
approach in trying to capture likelihoods of terrorism
attack in a single value is inadequate and misleading
as the process assumptions, the adequacy of histori-
cal data, and the strength of the assessor’s knowledge
all need to be communicated.
4.3. Evaluation of Resilience
While we focus our analysis on the risk analysis
portion of J100-10, resilience is also an integral part
of the decision-making process in J100-10. Here, we
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highlight some limitations regarding how resilience is
evaluated.
There are various definitions of resilience across
different disciplines. SRA defines resilience as the
“ability of a system to sustain or restore its basic
functionality following a risk source or an event”
(Society of Risk Analysis, 2015). This is in line with
the popular engineering (in particular infrastructure)
view that conceptualizes resilience as the ability
to “bounce back” following shocks (Cutter, 2016).
Other characterizations of resilience, particularly
in the social sciences, focus more on the capacity
for adaptive learning and change following events
(Cutter, 2016).
A literature review by Hosseini, Barker, and
Ramirez-Marquez (2016) highlights two key at-
tributes for characterizing engineering resilience: (1)
the system’s preparedness to absorb disruptions to
performance and (2) the ability for performance re-
covery. To this end, the definition provided by J100-
10 (see Section 1.2) is in line with the engineering
state of the art. However, the approaches J100-10
provides for characterizing resilience are too narrow.
The ORM metric in Equation (2) quantifies the ex-
pected amount of service denial because of a lost as-
set, and the OERM in Equation (3) measures the
dollar value of this loss to the utility. These metrics
are not adequate reflections of system resilience but
rather measures of consequence, and using them as
characterizations of resilience can seriously misguide
the decision maker.
Since J100-10 is specific to water infrastructure,
the key function for utilities to sustain or recovery
is to meet demand for clean water supply and to
prevent wastewater overflow. The temporal and
dynamic aspects of service recovery is crucial for
determining resilience (Alderson, Brown, & Carlyle,
2015b; Haimes, 2009) but is completely omitted in
J100-10. J100-10 instructs that individual component
resilience be quantified using Equations (2) and (3);
however, this notion has been thoroughly discredited
in the literature. Park, Seager, Rao, Convertino,
and Linkov (2013) argue that the nonlinear and
self-organizing features in complex systems make re-
silience impossible to measure when solely focusing
on individual assets. Rather an emphasis should be
placed on the performance of the entire system as a
whole.
Some alternative assessments of resilience
that J100-10 can apply are presented here. Two
survey-based methods for measuring system-wide re-
silience are provided in Shirali, Mohammadfam, and
Ebrahimipour (2013) and Cutter et al. (2008). In both
case studies, the authors worked with domain experts
to characterize indicators of resilience (e.g., redun-
dancy, robustness) and developed specific criteria
to identify whether an organization met these indi-
cators. Examples of quantitative methods for eval-
uating resilience involve stochastic simulation and
optimization. In simulation driven methods (Albores
& Shaw, 2008; Spiegler, Naim, & Wikner, 2012),
infrastructure models are subjected to hypotheti-
cal hazards and key performance indicators (e.g.,
percentage of on-time deliveries for supply chains)
are tracked. Optimization modeling (Alderson,
Brown, & Carlyle, 2015a; Faturechi, Levenberg, &
Miller-Hooks, 2014), in contrast, aims to estimate
least cost recovery or best-case performance for a
system after damage.
The above examples analyze resilience in re-
lation to well-defined objectives and disruptions.
Haimes (2009) argues that resilience should be fur-
ther expanded as the performance of a system can be
different for different types of shocks (e.g., natural
hazards vs intentional attacks). To address this issue,
Aven (2017a) argues that risk and resilience assess-
ments can be coupled together for a more complete
analysis.
Finally, the notion of community resilience
in J100-10 only references the economic impacts
of hazards, ignoring the multifaceted aspects of
community resilience and the need for all attributes
to be adequately captured in an analysis, as high-
lighted in Koliou et al. (2017) and Cutler et al.
(2018). These multifaceted aspects include physical,
environmental, financial, and social impacts.
5. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS
Here, we discuss some of the practical limita-
tions of the J100-10 assessment framework. One
such limitation is that the employed methods can
lead to inaccurate representations of risk. Other
limitations involve cases of ambiguity as a result of
how key metrics are estimated and interpreted.
5.1. Use of Worst Case Scenarios
As discussed in Section 2.2, relying exclusively
on worst-case assumptions when performing risk as-
sessments can result in misleading conclusions. Even
if there is certainty on the most extreme conse-
quence, analysis on worst-case outcomes alone will
always lead to mischaracterizations of risk because
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Table I. Summary of Example Threat-Asset Pair 1 with
Divergent Outcomes (Risk Calculated Using Equation (1))
Scenario Threat Consequence Vulnerability Risk
1-1 0.1 10000 0.001 1*
1-2 0.1 500 0.049 2.45
1-3 0.1 100 0.950 9.5
Expected
value
1 + 2.45 +
9.5 = 12.95
*Worst case only risk.
Table II. Summary of Example Threat-Asset Pair 2 with
Divergent Outcomes (Risk Calculated Using Equation (1))
Scenario Threat Consequence Vulnerability Risk
2-1 0.1 2000 0.002 0.4*





*Worst case only risk
all other possible outcomes are excluded. Consider,
for example, the threat-asset pair summarized in
Table I.
For the same threat event, which has probability
0.1 of occurrence, there are three possible outcome
scenarios with varying likelihoods. This is shown
by the different consequence values and their as-
sociated vulnerabilities. A worst-case-only analysis
would conclude that the associated risk is 1 (based
on scenario 1-1). However, if the other two outcome
scenarios are taken into account, the expected value
is 12.95. In comparison, consider the threat-asset pair
shown in Table II. For the same threat with likeli-
hood 0.1, there are two possible consequence sce-
narios. A worst-case-only analysis would determine
that the associated risk for this example is 0.4 (under
scenario 2-1). However, the expected value of risk,
which considers both outcomes weighted by their re-
spective likelihoods, is 50.3.
These examples serve as simple illustrations as to
why a full representation of all consequence scenar-
ios is needed for an accurate representation of risk.
Both example threat-asset pairs have high worst-
case consequences with low associated vulnerabili-
ties, which lead to very similar risk scoring (1 and
0.4, respectively). Taking a worst-case-only approach
would lead risk analysts to conclude that both threat-
asset pairs are subject to a similar level of risk as mea-
sured by Equation (1). Worst-case scenarios alone,
however, do not accurately represent the risk of the
threat-asset pairs. In both examples, the worst-case
scenarios are also the least likely to occur. After
considering the other possible scenarios, the result-
ing risk calculations again using Equation (1) (12.95
and 50.3, respectively) show that the second exam-
ple is clearly the riskier threat-asset pair, with close
to four times the risk value. The assumption here is
that the expected value is an adequate risk measure,
which is a very questionable assumption. This clear
distinction in the risk description is overlooked when
a worst-case-only basis is used.
A worst-case-only approach is quite popular in
other domains beyond critical infrastructure analysis
(e.g., financial [Zhu & Fukushima, 2009] and envi-
ronmental risk assessments [Huysman, Madarasz, &
Dassargues, 2006; Karl, Wright, Berglen, & Denby,
2011]). The limitations of using conservative “worst-
case” methods have been thoroughly discussed and
criticized in the literature (Paté-Cornell, 1999). We
refer the reader to Aven (2016) for an expanded dis-
cussion. Considering the full range of possible out-
comes and their consequences in the analysis will
lead to more informative descriptions of risk. In addi-
tion to the probabilistic characterizations, judgments
of the strength of knowledge supporting these should
be included as highlighted in Section 4.2.
An alternate characterization of risk is to present
information on the underlying consequence distribu-
tions, for example, showing the 25th , 50th, and 75th
percentiles as well as the expected and worst-case
scenarios. A common and more complete probabilis-
tic representation in the risk analysis literature is the
use of Frequency-Number types of curves (e.g., in-
verse cumulative distributions), discussed in Aven
(2013), which plot all possible consequence values
against their respective inverse cumulative probabil-
ities, that is, the probabilities for events leading to at
least N units of loss (e.g., fatalities).
5.2. Defining and Estimating Consequences
It is important to display a full range of conse-
quence scenarios for risk estimations. The J100-10
framework defines four baseline metrics for measur-
ing consequence. These are (1) number of fatalities,
(2) number of serious injuries, (3) financial loss to
utility owners, and (4) economic losses to the com-
munity. The standard suggests that other facets of
consequence, such as degradation in public confi-
dence and environmental impacts, can also be in-
cluded if the analyst deems necessary. Detailed cal-
culations using simulation and economic models or
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direct estimation by qualified experts are acceptable
methods of determining consequences according to
J100-10.
The risk valuation in Equation (1) requires a
single value for the consequence metric. However,
it is unclear how, or even if, an analyst should ag-
gregate across metrics. For example, no guidance
is offered for combining the metric estimates of 10
deaths, five injuries, $5 million in financial losses to
the utility, and $15 million in economic losses to the
serviced community. This process becomes more dif-
ficult when qualitative assessments of consequences
are also considered.
There are a number of ways to encode conse-
quences into a single metric. One method is to mon-
etize fatalities and injuries to provide a common unit
of measure to sum consequences from each category.
A similar approach is to normalize each metric into
an ordinal scale (e.g.,1–10) and sum the normaliza-
tions. J100-10 provides a 0 to10 consequence scale
for each category (AWWA, 2010), which the analyst
can opt to use. This approach makes an implicit as-
sumption about the inherent value of different con-
sequence outcomes, and disagreements about these
valuations may arise when multiple decision makers
are involved. For example, according to the J100-
10, one fatality is equal to $1 million in economic
losses to either the utility or the community. These
assumptions need to be made explicit to the decision
maker and J100-10 does not provide any direction on
doing so.
Additional outcome aggregating methods are
also presented in the risk analysis literature. The field
of decision analysis supports the use of multiattribute
utility theory (MAUT) to encode a variety of deci-
sion maker preferences into a numerical value, and
has been demonstrated in many engineering risk as-
sessments (Brito & de Almeida, 2009; Merkhofer &
Keeney, 1987; Michaud & Apostolakis, 2006). Ayyub
(2014) introduces other methods for assessing conse-
quences and severities including cause-consequence
(CS) diagrams and total economic valuation (TEV).
CS diagrams use a tree representation of multi-
ple consequence categories (e.g., fatalities, economic
costs) and assess their respective severities using
logic diagrams. These severities are combined addi-
tively in an ordinal scale. TEV uses willingness to pay
or accept methods to estimate the market value, mea-
sured in dollars, of lost goods and services.
While there is a host of processes for combin-
ing consequence metrics into a single value, it is un-
clear what this single value represents. In making this
calculation, the system operator must make assump-
tions regarding the value of consequences to other
stakeholders, and in doing so, the utility imposes its
own value structure on these stakeholders. Accord-
ing to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1950),
it is generally impossible for any analyst to accu-
rately encompass each stakeholder’s diverse prefer-
ences under a set of numerical weights. Survey meth-
ods are available as a foundation to begin the analysis
of contrasting value judgments, but they require time
and resources that the utility may not be willing to
commit.
Therefore, in some situations utilities may find
it beneficial to keep the consequence categories dis-
aggregated. While this can lead to a less quantifiable
measure of risk (i.e., Equation [1] can no longer be
applied), more information can be communicated in
the assessment results. Lundberg and Willis (2019)
present one approach for carrying out risk assess-
ments while dealing with nonaggregate outcomes.
The authors use a survey-based method to identify
a ranking of consequences attributes. This informa-
tion allows the analyst to prioritize one category
over another. Kabir, Balek, and Tesfamariam (2018)
presents a quantitative Bayesian network model for
modeling consequences due to infrastructure fail-
ures. The model disaggregates outcomes based on
health and safety, environmental, societal, and eco-
nomic impacts. Expert judgment is used to define the
dependencies between various outcome measures.
5.3. Analysis Resolution of Threat-Asset Pairs
An accurate estimation of the consequences of a
hazard on complex systems requires the analysis of
multiple components together and the consideration
of their interdependencies. Consequently, analyzing
risk and resilience only at the threat-asset pair resolu-
tion overlooks the dependency between components
(Alderson et al., 2015b).
This integrated relationship between assets can
be illustrated through a simple example. A reliabil-
ity block diagram (RBD) is a visual method that
describes how individual components contribute to
the overall functioning of a complex system (Aven,
2003). Here, the functioning or success of the sys-
tem is defined as the extent to which it can carry
out its mission. In the case of water systems, this in-
volves the adequate delivery of clean drinking water
to end users. Each block in a diagram represents a
system function, which can correspond to individual
components of the system (e.g., treatment plant or
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Fig. 2. Reliability block diagram of example system.
storage tank) that can fail with a given probability
upon an incident hazard. Blocks can be connected
in parallel or series; parallel paths introduce redun-
dancy into the system, where all blocks within a par-
allel block must fail before the network fails. On the
other hand, any failure to a single block in a group of
blocks connected in series will cause system failure.
Fig. 2 illustrates a simple system with three com-
ponents, represented by blocks A, B, and C. Com-
ponent A is connected in series to a parallel set of
components B and C. This means failures to A alone,
or B and C together, or to all three components can
lead to system failure. Risk analysis of this system
at the threat-asset level involves only evaluating the
consequences of failure when components A, B, and
C fail individually. The redundancy relationship be-
tween B and C is not captured in the analysis at this
resolution. A consequence estimate on the failure of
asset B assuming asset C is functional may only in-
clude costs of damage repair; however, if asset C also
fails, the consequence may be much more severe as
it involves repairs to both components and economic
losses due to service interruption.
The simplifying example above serves to illus-
trate that an accurate assessment of threat conse-
quences requires information from multiple compo-
nents of the system, and examining risk at the asset
levels overlooks this relationship by requiring the an-
alyst to make implicit assumptions about the condi-
tion of other components. The assessment can be im-
proved where joint impacts, particularly cases where
consequences of failures to a group of assets will ex-
ceed the sum of consequences from individual fail-
ures itself, are captured.
Aside from RBDs, graph theory (or network
theory) is another method researchers have used
to study the system-wide impacts related to indi-
vidual component failure (see Alenazi & Sterbenz,
2015; Larocca & Guikema, 2011; Yazdani & Jef-
frey, 2012). In these network models, infrastructure
components are represented through a series of arcs
and nodes (Dunn, Fu, Wilkinson, & Dawson, 2013).
Each node represents a demand point, storage site,
treatment site, or generation facility. Arcs represent
distribution assets (e.g., wire cables for power sys-
tems, pipelines for water and gas networks). These
studies have aimed to examine which network met-
rics (betweenness, centrality, etc.) are most useful
in providing an accurate characterization of network
resilience. Articles by Alderson et al. (2015b) and
Alderson, Brown, Carlyle, and Anthony Cox (2013)
emphasize the use of physical infrastructure mod-
els rather than simple topological representations to
provide the most accurate reflections of network per-
formance. Larocca, Johansson, Hassel, and Guikema
(2015) compared a range of topological metrics and
physical models to measure power system perfor-
mance, and found that combining graph theory with
physical flow models provided the most accurate in-
sights.
5.4. Threats Defined
Another issue of implementation is the limited
scope of the 41 reference threats listed in Fig. 3. The
RAMCAPTM framework, which the J100-10 stan-
dard is based on, was originally developed to deal
with terrorism threats, and 31 out of the 41 refer-
ence threats deal with malevolent threats. As a result,
the analysis scope can be biased toward this single
threat category. This can lead to a suboptimal allo-
cation of resources to countermeasures that are ded-
icated to increasing the physical security of the sys-
tem at the expense of hardening the system against
(arguably) more frequent natural hazards. For ex-
ample, a countermeasure, such as adding more secu-
rity personnel, can decrease the risk for many of the
31 reference terrorist threats. Because of the large
overlap in the types of threats and how to defend
against them, implementing mitigation options for
one of these threats also serves to mitigate several
other threats. As a result, the estimated net benefit
of counter-terrorism defenses will be overinflated.
On the other hand, countermeasures for natural
hazards tend to be more specific to the threat, for ex-
ample, installing floodwalls around coastal treatment
plants to reduce flood damage. The limited overlap
in affected threats from these countermeasures can
lead to lower net benefits after summing over all
threat-asset pairs. This shows that the J100-10 refer-
ence threat set typically biases the user to allocate
resources to defend against terrorist threats over
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Fig. 3. RAMCAPTM Reference hazards used in J100-10. Figure taken from the J100-10 risk management standard (AWWA, 2010).
other hazard categories. For some general guidance
on how to use cost-benefit type analysis, see Aven
(2017a) and Ale, Hartford, and Slater (2018).
As noted in Section 2.2, two studies presented by
White, Burkhart, et al. (2016) and White, George,
et al. (2016) argue that the operating 41 refer-
ence threats do not adequately address the emerg-
ing threats of climate change, aging infrastructure,
and cyber security. While J100-10 allows analysts
to include additional threats, it lacks guidance in
how to define events that encompass these emerg-
ing threats and how to calculate the respective threat
likelihoods. Furthermore, the subjectivity involved
in adding more events can lead to inconsistencies
when different analysts are performing the risk as-
sessments.
5.5. Risk versus Resilience Tradeoff
In steps 6 and 7 of the J100-10 methodology,
risk and resilience are calculated, countermeasures
are defined, and resources are allocated based on
cost-benefit analysis. However, there is ambiguity in
choosing how to allocate these resources based on
the different metrics. Step 7 (risk and resilience man-
agement) specifies that utilities need to define what
acceptable levels of risk and resilience are, and im-
plement countermeasures to meet these predefined
thresholds.
As defined by J100-10, resilience and risk are two
different outcomes. When dealing with various out-
comes, an analyst must work with the stakeholders to
elicit the value of resilience enhancement versus risk
reduction. Decision makers need to understand the
tradeoffs between the risk and resilience objectives
in order for the assessment to be actionable. Unfor-
tunately, the importance of eliciting these value judg-
ments is omitted from J100-10.
There is, however, a strong argument in the risk
research community that the separation between risk
and resilience is artificial and that the risk concept
should cover resilience (Aven, 2018). This is because
any actions performed to affect one will also affect
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the other: reductions in risk will also increase re-
silience, and vice versa. Aven (2017a) argues that as-
sessments are more effective when the two outcomes
are considered together, rather than treated as sepa-
rated objectives.
As it currently stands, J100-10 is too vague in
its definition of the relationship between risk and
resilience. Improvements to the standard can either
solely focus on risk, and target reductions in risk,
or integrate risk and resilience together for a more
holistic assessment.
6. DISCUSSION
In this study, we performed a comprehensive
review of the risk and resilience assessment frame-
work in the J100-10, a certified standard adopted
by the water and wastewater industry. The frame-
work adopts the seven-step methodology outlined
in RAMCAPTM, which applies to multiple sectors
of CIKR. Our analysis examined both conceptual
limitations within the standard and practical issues
with carrying out the risk and resilience assessment
processes.
The main conceptual shortcomings are (1) the
exclusion of notions of uncertainty when defining
risk, (2) a clear definition for probability and how
to interpret the values are not presented, and (3) re-
silience measures are too narrow. In particular, the
differences between frequentist and Bayesian prob-
ability need to be highlighted, and the conceptual-
izations used need to be communicated in the final
analysis results. Our key findings on the practical lim-
itations relate to the mischaracterization of risk, the
biased emphasis placed on malevolent threats, and
the general ambiguity in defining and comparing key
metrics.
When calculating risk, using only a worst-case
assumption of the associated consequences without
considering the full range of possible outcome sce-
narios will result in a poor risk characterization. Fur-
thermore, risk and resilience analysis at the reso-
lution of individual threat-asset pairs ignores key
dependencies between assets in connected systems.
This resolution can lead to risk judgments that are
too low in cases where combined consequences of
hazards on multiple assets at a time will be far greater
than the sum of the individual parts.
On the same note of accurately representing con-
sequences, the standard uses four key metrics: fatal-
ities, injuries, and economic losses to both the utility
and community. Additional qualitative evaluations
of consequence can also be included. The J100-10
standard does not provide adequate guidance on how
to bring these four metrics, measured in different
units, and other qualitative aspects of consequence,
together into a single consequence value. This ambi-
guity can lead to inconsistencies in the risk analysis
process.
The J100-10 defines 41 reference threats as part
of the assessment, 31 of which are related to malevo-
lent threats. The disproportionate representation of
risk related to one category of threat can lead to bi-
ased conclusions about inflated benefits gained from
counter-terrorism defenses. It is important for result-
ing updates of the J100-10 and RAMCAPTM stan-
dard to account for any overlap when weighing the
tradeoff between countermeasures designed to ad-
dress malevolent threats versus natural hazards ver-
sus proximity and dependency hazards.
Lastly, the J100-10 standard needs to better ad-
dress the relationship between the concepts of risk
and resilience. This is critical for using the J100-10 in
an effective decision making context. The vagueness
of the current standard can also introduce arbitrari-
ness and inconsistencies, with potential for poor in-
vestments of available resources.
The shortcomings summarized above can assist
with prioritization in redrafts of the standard by high-
lighting areas that need to be addressed. By closing
the gap between the standard’s methods and those
that are the state of the art in the risk analysis lit-
erature, more informed risk-driven decisions can be
made to better protect the nation’s critical lifeline
infrastructure.
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